Monetary Governance Limits

Crises, Memory, and the Conditions of Authority

In recent decades, monetary policy has shifted its focus from purely technical instruments toward the management of expectations and the production of credibility. Central banks no longer act solely on interest rates or the money supply, but also on the public interpretation of the economic future. Their power depends, to a large extent, on their ability to convince — to make their diagnoses credible, their promises believable, and their announcements capable of coordinating the decisions of multiple actors. However, this symbolic power rests on institutional frameworks, social relations, and historical memories that can either sustain or undermine it. This project examines precisely these social foundations of monetary authority and the limits faced by governance grounded in the power of central bank
discourse.

Through the study of contexts marked by persistent monetary instability, the project analyzes how repeated crises and failed policies cement narratives of distrust deeply rooted in society — such as the conviction that neither the state nor the banks can guarantee the value of money. These narratives are transmitted through collective memory, shape everyday practices — such as dollarization or cash hoarding — and narrow the room for maneuver of monetary authorities.

Drawing on documentary analysis and interviews with officials, economists, and citizens, the research shows how lived experiences of crisis reconfigure the relationship between the population and the central bank, transforming trust into a fragile, uneven, and contested resource. Monetary trust is not given, but a contingent outcome of shared experiences, persistent memories, and expectations that must be rebuilt time and again in the face of instability. It is a tenuous thread between past and present, tightening with each new crisis and reminding us that money ultimately rests on a promise that is always fragile.

In parallel, the research delves into monetary institutions to explore the performative limits of governance and the tensions that emerge when the central bank’s word loses its force. If contemporary monetary authority relies on the capacity to steer expectations through words, its effectiveness also depends on the presence of social and institutional conditions that grant the central bank epistemic authority to define policies that are accepted and credible:
institutional trustworthiness, alignment between the bank’s goals and those of key actors such as trade unions and economic groups, and coherence between policy instruments and financial infrastructures. Where these conditions are absent, the central bank’s word loses epistemic authority, and stability becomes an aspiration rather than a fact.

By situating monetary policy within its social and historical fabric, this project seeks to rethink central bank governance from a sociological perspective. Beyond technical instruments and formal models, it shows that monetary authority is a relational and historical construction, sustained — or eroded — by memories, institutional arrangements, and shared expectations that define the real limits of monetary power.

Check out my latest publications!
Moreno, G. 2025. Remembering Crises: The Making of Monetary Distrust in Argentina Socio-Economic Review, June, 2025.
Moreno, G. 2025. Untrustworthy Authorities and Complicit Bankers: Unraveling Monetary Max Planck Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Discussion Paper 25/3.